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Considerable debate has erupted over the extent to which
top-down attentional control can prevent distraction from
irrelevant stimuli. Attentional allocation is thought to be
controlled by two distinct mechanisms. On the one hand,
attentional control is thought to be goal-directed when at-
tentional priority is given to only those objects and events
that are in line with the current goals of the observer. On
the other hand, attentional control is thought to occur in a
stimulus-drivenmanner when, irrespective of the intentions
or goals of the observer, objects and events involuntarily
receive attentional priority, a phenomenon referred to as
attentional capture (for reviews, see, e.g., Theeuwes, 1993,
1994a, and Yantis, 1996, 2000). 
It is well known that a salient object can be detected in
visual search without scrutiny. A stimulus that is locally
unique in a basic visual dimension (such as color, orienta-
tion, or motion) will pop out from the search display. Time
to find these types of elements—usually referred to as fea-
ture singletons, or simply singletons— is independent of
the number of elements in the display. 
When confronted with a display containing a feature
singleton (such as a red element among gray elements), it
may appear that the feature singleton captures attention in
a purely stimulus-driven or bottom-up manner. It appears
that attention is automatically, without any intention on the
part of the observer, attracted to the location of the feature
singleton. Yet the conclusion that featural singletons cap-
ture attention in a purely stimulus-driven way is often in-
correct, because in many experiments, the feature single-
ton is the search target (see, e.g., Yantis, 2000). Obviously,
when participants are set to look for a particular feature
singleton, it is difficult to argue that attentional allocation
to the feature singleton target is stimulus driven. As was
pointed out by Yantis and Egeth (1999), one can speak of
attentional capture in a purely stimulus-driven fashion
only when the stimulus feature in question is completely
task irrelevant, so that there is no incentive for the observer
to attend to it deliberately. As was expressed by Yantis and
Egeth, “If an object with such an attribute captures atten-
tion under these conditions, then and only then can that at-
tribute be said to capture attention in a purely stimulus-
driven fashion “ (p. 663). 
Yantis and Jonides (1984; see also Jonides & Yantis,
1988; Theeuwes, 1990) used this notion to determine
which singletons are able to capture attention in a purely
stimulus-driven way. In these experiments, there was al-
ways one feature singleton present; yet the feature single-
ton was task irrelevant, because its location was uncorre-
lated with the position of the target. In other words, there
was no incentive for participants to attend deliberately to
the feature singleton. Using this paradigm, Jonides and
Yantis concluded that only abrupt onsets capture attention
exogenously; salient static singletons do not. 
Theeuwes (1991, 1992, 1996; Theeuwes & Burger,
1998) also investigated whether feature singletons capture
attention exogenously. He used a somewhat different par-
adigm, referred to as the additional singleton paradigm
(e.g., Simons, 2000). In the additional singleton task, par-
ticipants perform a visual search task, and one item in the
search display is a unique salient feature singleton that is
completely unrelated to the search task and is never the
search item. These experiments typically show that search
performance is slower when an additional salient singleton
is present, relative to when no singleton is present. Unlike
the paradigm employed by Yantis and colleagues (e.g.,
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Previous research has shown that a salient feature singleton may capture attention in a stimulus-driven,
bottom-up fashion (e.g., Theeuwes, 1992, 1994b). This conclusion has been challenged by others claim-
ing that the observed attentional capture by irrelevant singletons may not be stimulus driven but due
to top-down attentional control settings and/or nonspatial filtering costs. In the present study, we show
that inhibition of return (IOR) occurs at the location of an irrelevant singleton. Participants were slower
to detect a target presented at the location of the irrelevant singleton, relative to other locations. Since
IOR can be observed only as a result of an exogenous, stimulus-drivenshift of spatial attention, it is un-
likely that top-down control settings and/or nonspatial filtering costs played a role. In line with earlier
claims, the present findings provide strong evidence that salient singletons capture spatial attention in
a purely bottom-up way.
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Yantis & Egeth, 1999; Yantis & Jonides, 1984), in which
the singleton is the target at chance level, in Theeuwes’s
additional singleton paradigm, observers have absolutely
no strategic reason to search for the irrelevant singleton,
because it is never the target. Attending to the irrelevant
singleton would, therefore, consistently harm performance. 
Theeuwes (1991, 1992, 1994b, 1996) explained the in-
crease in search time for conditions in which an irrelevant
singleton was present in terms of attentional capture. Be-
cause attention was exogenously captured by the irrele-
vant singleton, attention needed to be deallocated from
that location before it could be directed to the location of
the target singleton. Note that, in line with the definition
of attentional capture (see Yantis & Egeth, 1999), any spa-
tial attention directed to the location of the irrelevant sin-
gleton would, indeed, suggest attentional capture. The re-
quirement that “one can only speak of attentional capture
in a purely stimulus-driven fashion when the stimulus fea-
ture in question is completely task-irrelevant” (Yantis &
Egeth, 1999, p. 663) was clearly fulfilled. Other re-
searchers using Theeuwes’s paradigm (or variations of the
paradigm) also have shown that the presence of a salient
singleton interfered with search for a target (Bacon &
Egeth, 1994, Experiment 1; Caputo & Guerra, 1998;
Joseph & Optican, 1996; Kawahara & Toshima, 1996;
Kim & Cave, 1999; Kumada, 1999; Turatto & Galfano,
2001). 
Recently, however, Folk and Remington (1998) offered
an alternative explanation for the interference observed by
Theeuwes. They suggested that the increase in search time
caused by the irrelevant singleton is due to what they call
filtering costs, in line with the notion suggested by Kah-
neman, Treisman, and Burkell (1983). The idea of filtering
costs is that the presence of an irrelevant singleton may
slow the deployment of attention to the target singleton by
requiring an effortful and time-consuming filtering oper-
ation. According to this line of reasoning, attention is em-
ployed in a top-down way and goes directly to the target sin-
gleton; simply because, in addition to the target singleton,
another irrelevant singleton is present, directing attention
to the target singleton may require more time than it does
when no irrelevant singleton is present. Note that this view
does not entail an exogenous shift of spatial attention to
the location of the irrelevant singleton. The filtering cost
explanation is compatible with the notion that top-down
control selectively guides spatial attention to the target
singleton. 
A study conducted by Theeuwes (1996) appears to be in-
consistent with the filtering hypothesis of Folk and Rem-
ington (1998). Participants performed a typical additional
singleton search (e.g., Theeuwes, 1992). The response con-
gruency of the character at the location of the irrelevant
distractor was manipulated. On half of the trials, the char-
acter at the distractor location was associated with the same
response as that required by the target, whereas on the
other half, it was opposite to that required by the target.
Theeuwes (1996) argued that the identity of the character
at the location of the irrelevant singleton could have an ef-
fect on responding only if, at some point, spatial attention
was deployed to the location of the distractor. If, in line
with Folk and Remington’s filtering notion, attention goes
directly and exclusively to the target location, there should
not be a congruency effect of a character presented at the
irrelevant singleton location. In other words, if attention
never goes to the location of the irrelevant singleton, it is
impossible that the identity of a character can have any ef-
fect on responding. It should be noted that the task was
designed in such a way that the identity of the character
could become available only after focal spatial attention
was directed to that location. In addition to the typical inter-
ference effect caused by the irrelevant singleton, Theeuwes
(1996) showed a congruency effect, providing strong evi-
dence that before a response was made, spatial attention
was at the location of the irrelevant singleton. This find-
ing was completely in line with the notion that spatial at-
tention was captured by the irrelevant singleton.
Folk and Remington (1998) came up with an alternative
explanation for the congruency effect reported by Theeuwes
(1996). In line with the notion of perceptual load (Lavie,
1995), they suggested that when the number of objects is
small, identity information can influence response mech-
anisms in parallel. In other words, they claimed that atten-
tion went in parallel to both the target and the irrelevant dis-
tractor, causing a congruency effect on responding. Even
though it is not clear whether such parallel processing re-
flects the same processing mechanisms as filtering costs,
it is clear that this explanation is not in line with the no-
tion that the irrelevant singleton captures spatial attention. 
In addition to the notion of filtering costs, yet another ex-
planation for Theeuwes’s (1992) findings was offered by
Bacon and Egeth (1994). They argued that in Theeuwes’s
experiments, the irrelevant singleton did not capture at-
tention exogenously but because, against the instructions
of the experimenter, participants chose to search for sin-
gletons instead of searching for a particular feature (such
as the feature red). Because participants chose the single-
ton detection mode over the instructed feature search
mode, any singleton could capture attention. In this way,
it is argued, attention went to the irrelevant singleton as a
result of a top-down control setting, rather than as a result
of bottom-up attentional capture. This notion is consistent
with the contingent capture model suggested by Folk,
Remington, and Johnston (1992), which suggests that
only stimuli that match the top-down control settings will
capture attention; stimuli that do not match the top-down
settings will be ignored.
Even though it is possible that attentional capture by ir-
relevant singletons in Theeuwes’s experiments was the re-
sult of top-down control settings, it should be noted that,
according to the definition provided by Yantis and Egeth
(1999), the observation that attention first goes to the ir-
relevant singleton would present a strong case of purely
stimulus-driven capture (see also Theeuwes & Godijn,
2001). In line with the definition used by Yantis and Egeth,
there was no incentive to attend to the irrelevant feature
singleton, because it was never task relevant and attending
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to the singleton consistently harmed performance. If ob-
servers attended to the irrelevant singleton regardless of
these performance costs, this would (according to Yantis &
Egeth, 1999) present a strong case of stimulus-driven at-
tentional capture. 
The present study was designed to determine whether
salient singletons capture attention in a purely stimulus-
driven fashion. We designed an experiment that rules out
the two above-mentioned alternative explanations. First, it
rules out the notion that interference of irrelevant single-
tons is due to filtering costs, as was advocated by Folk and
Remington (1998). Second, it rules out the notion that at-
tentional capture by irrelevant singletons is the result of
top-down control settings, such as the singleton detection
mode, as was suggested by Bacon and Egeth (1994). In the
present study, participants had to detect the offset of a gray
dot. The participants viewed displays consisting of eight
outline circles equally spaced around a fixation point on
an imaginary circle. In the center of each of the eight out-
line circles was a small gray dot. All the outline circles were
gray except for one, which was red. The red circle consti-
tuted the uniquely colored irrelevant singleton. The par-
ticipants viewed the display for 1,300 msec and then had
to detect whether or not one of the small dots was turned
off. The target dot that was extinguished was presented at
chance levels in the red circle. In other words, the location
of the target (i.e., the location at which the small gray dot
would be extinguished) was uncorrelated with the loca-
tion of the uniquely colored red singleton. We measured
detection times and separated trials in which the target dot
was extinguished in the uniquely colored red circle from
those in which it was extinguished in any of three nonsin-
gleton circles. 
In the present study, we used the phenomenon of inhi-
bition of return (IOR; Posner & Cohen, 1984) to deter-
mine whether spatial attention went to the location of the
irrelevant singleton. The basic claim underlying IOR is
that after attention is reflexively shifted to a location in
space, there is delayed responding to stimuli subsequently
displayed at that location (see Klein, 2000, for a review).
If the red circle captured attention exogenously and
1,300 msec later the dot happened to be extinguished in
the red circle (i.e., the irrelevant singleton), then because
of IOR, we would expect detection times to be slower than
when the dot was extinguished in any of the gray circles
(the nonsingleton). If the red circle did not capture atten-
tion, there is no reason to expect any differences in detec-
tion times between a dot extinguished in a gray circle (a
nonsingleton) versus a dot extinguished in a red circle (a
singleton).
Two aspects of IOR are particularly important for the
present study: First, if responding to the offset of the dot
at the location of the singleton is slowed, one has to as-
sume that such slowing is due to the occurrence of IOR.
IOR is typically associated with attentional spatial pro-
cessing. Since only one singleton was present, it is impos-
sible to attribute such IOR slowing to such notions as fil-
tering costs or parallel processing of information at different
locations. 
Second, IOR at a particular location in space follows only
after attention has shifted reflexively to that location. Typ-
ically, IOR does not follow a shift of attention that is di-
rected endogenously (voluntarily; Posner & Cohen, 1984;
Pratt, Kingstone, & Khoe, 1997). In other words, if IOR
occurs, it can only be the result of a shift of exogenous at-
tention or, in the terminology used in the visual search lit-
erature, the result of purely stimulus-driven attentional cap-
ture. As was recently shown by Pratt, Sekuler, and McAuliffe
(2001), if participants use a top-down attentional control
setting, such as a singleton detection mode, one will not
find IOR effects (but see Gibson & Amelio, 2000). Find-
ing IOR rules out the possibility that attentional capture is
due to some top-down strategy used by the participant.
EXPERIMENT 1
Since we wanted to use the occurrence of IOR as a means
to determine exogenous attentional capture at the location
of the singleton, we chose a detection task, rather than a
discrimination task, because there is evidence showing
that IOR is more robust in detection tasks than in dis-
crimination tasks (see, e.g., Klein & Taylor, 1994; Terry,
Valdes, & Neill, 1994; but see, e.g., Fuentes, Vivas, &
Humphreys, 1999; Lupiáñez, Milán, Tornay, Madrid, &
Tudela, 1997).
Method
Participants. Ten participants, ranging in age between 18 and 30
years, participated as paid volunteers. All had self-reported normal
or corrected-to-normal vision and reported having no color vision
defects. 
Apparatus. A Dell Pentium Optiplex GX-1 with a Dell SVGA
color monitor controlled the timing of the events, generated stimuli
and recorded reaction times (RTs). The space bar of the computer
keyboard was used as a response button. Each participant was tested
in a sound-attenuate d, dimly lit room, his or her head resting on a chin-
rest. The monitor was located at eye level, 93 cm from the chinrest. 
Stimuli. The visual field consisted of eight circles (1.2º) equally
spaced around the fixation point on an imaginary circle (5.2º). In the
center of each of the outline circles was a small gray target dot (0.3º;
16.5 cd/m2 ). All the circles were gray (CIE chromaticity coordinates
.285, .315; 13.5 cd/m2 ) except one, which was red (CIE chromatic-
ity coordinates .592, .361; 13.5 cd/m2 ). Red and gray were matched
for luminance. 
Initially, a center fixation cross, along with eight gray circles each
having a small dot in the middle, was presented. After 500 msec, the
center fixation point was extinguished. One of the gray circles
changed to an equiluminant red 980 msec later. In order to attract at-
tention back to the central fixation cross (see, e.g., Posner & Cohen,
1984, who used a similar procedure), the center fixation cross reap-
peared after 350 msec. On 80% of the trials, one of the small dots
inside one of the circles was extinguished 950 msec later, constitut-
ing the target event. If the small target dot was to be extinguished, it
was extinguished within a circle presented at one of four possible lo-
cations (145, 135, 225, or 315 deg of arc). After 183 msec, the dis-
play was extinguished. The total time between the presentation of
the red circle and the disappearance of the target was 1,300 msec, a
time interval that is known to be large enough to generate IOR (see,
e.g., Klein, 2000). 
Design and Procedure. Each participant performed 120 trials.
Twenty percent of the trials (24 trials) were catch trials in which none
of the small target dots was extinguished and participants were re-
quired to refrain from responding. Of the four possible target loca-
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tions, the small dot disappeared at chance in the red circle. When
the participants detected the offset of one of the small dots, they were
required to press the space bar as quickly as possible. The participants
were instructed not to respond when no dot disappeared.
The participants were told to keep their eyes fixated at the fixa-
tion cross. The participants received 120 practice trials prior to the
experimental trials. The participants received feedback about their
performance (in terms of RTs and missed and false alarm error rates)
after each block of 30 trials. 
Results and Discussion
When the offset occurred in the color singleton (the
uniquely colored red circle), RT to detect the offset was
longer (mean RT of 350 msec) than when the offset ap-
peared in a nonsingleton circle [mean RT of 322 msec;
F(1,9)5 11.06, p , .01]. This finding indicates that IOR
occurred at the location of the uniquely colored red sin-
gleton. Error rates were low (missed targets, 1.8%) and
were not systematically related to whether the offset ap-
peared in the singleton or not. False alarm error rates were
also low (5.8%).
EXPERIMENT 2
Even though it has recently been argued that finding a
biphasic pattern of early facilitation and late inhibition
should not be considered as the definitive signature of
IOR (Pratt, Hillis, & Gold, 2001), finding such an early
facilitation component would provide additional evidence
that we are dealing with shifts of spatial attention. In Ex-
periment 2, we used a short stimulus onset asynchrony
(SOA) to determine whether such an early facilitation com-
ponent occurred. 
Method
Participants . Twelve naive participants, ranging in age between
18 and 30 years, participated as paid volunteers.
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Design. The experiment was identical to
Experiment 1, except that in 80% of the trials, one of the small dots
was extinguished 133 msec after the presentation of the uniquely
colored singleton. The complete display was switched off 183 msec
after the offset of the target dot. In the present experiment, the cen-
ter fixation dot remained on throughout a trial. 
Results and Discussion
When the offset occurred in the color singleton, RTs to
detect the offset were shorter (mean RT of 328 msec) than
when the offset appeared in one of the nonunique gray cir-
cles [mean RT of 347 msec; F(1,11)5 7.06, p, .05]. This
finding indicates that early in time (within 133 msec), at-
tention was drawn to the location of the colored singleton.
Error rates were low (missed targets, 2.3%) and were not
systematically related to the conditions manipulated. False
alarm rates were 9.0%
EXPERIMENT 3
Even though Experiment 1 showed a clear IOR effect,
there are several concerns regarding the method. First, one
may argue that the equiluminant color change that we used
in Experiment 1 to reveal the color singleton represented
a change not only in luminance, as would be the case with
abrupt onsets, but also in color. Even though it is known
that an equiluminant color change cannot capture atten-
tion even when observers are set to look for such a change
(Theeuwes, 1995), it is still possible that small luminance
changes occurred when the singleton was revealed. To
rule out the possibility that either color or luminance
changes caused IOR, the colors of all the elements but one
were changed, leaving a singleton as the only unchanged
element in the display. Second, in Experiment 1, the sin-
gleton was presented at one of the four quadrants of the vi-
sual field, and the target dot, if it was extinguished, was
extinguished within a circle presented at one of these four
possible target locations. Within these constraints of these
four possible target locations, the target dot disappeared at
chance level in the singleton. However, the whole visual
field consisted of circles, suggesting that the singleton
predicted the target with a 25% probability, which is con-
siderably higher than if the target were equally likely at
any one of the eight possible locations. Thus, in Experi-
ment 1, the singleton location was unpredictive relative to
any of the other possible target locations; however, it was
not unpredictive relative to the whole stimulus display
consisting of eight circles. In the present experiment, the
Figure 1. Sequence of frames on a given trial. After 500 msec, the fixation cross was switched off. After 980 msec, the color of one
of the gray circles changed from gray to equiluminant red, revealing a color singleton. After 350 msec, the fixation cross was switched
back on. After another delay of 950 msec, a small gray dot in one of the circles was switched off. The target dot was switched off in
80% of the trials, either within the color singleton circle or in one of the nonsingleton circles. The participants detected the offset of
the small gray dot.
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singleton and the target dot were equally likely at any of
the eight possible locations. In other words, there was a
12.5% chance that the singleton and the target dot location
would coincide. Third, it may be argued that it was specif-
ically the color red among gray that caused the attentional
capture and the subsequent IOR. To ensure that it was not
the color red that mattered, in the present experiment, the
singleton was the only gray element among red elements. 
Method
Participants . Ten naive participants, ranging in age between 18
and 25 years, participated as paid volunteers.
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Design . The experiment was similar to
Experiment 1. But unlike Experiment 1, in which only one circle
changed color, all the circles but one changed from gray (CIE chro-
maticity coordinates .271, .319; 8.4 cd/m2) to red (CIE chromaticity
coordinates .613, .343; 8.4 cd/m2). In other words, the singleton was
the only element in the display that did not change. 
Each participant performed 240 trials. Twenty percent of the tri-
als (48 trials) were catch trials. Of the remaining 192 trials, the tar-
get dot was extinguished at chance level at any of the eight possible
locations. Each participant received 120 practice trials. 
Results and Discussion
When the offset occurred in the color singleton (in this
case, a uniquely colored gray circle), RTs to detect the off-
set were longer (mean RT of 316 msec) than when the off-
set appeared in a nonsingleton circle [mean RT of 304 msec;
F(1,9) 5 13.30, p , .01]. The results basically replicate
those of Experiment 1 and indicate that IOR occurred at
the location of the uniquely colored gray circle. Note that
an across-experiments analysis showed that there were no
reliable differences in the degree of IOR between Experi-
ments 1 and 3. It appears that none of the methodological
concerns outlined above held up. Error rates were low
(2.2%) and were not related to the conditions manipu-
lated. False alarm rates were low (3.5%).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present results show that a static irrelevant, uniquely
colored singleton can cause an IOR to the location of the
singleton. These results can only be interpreted as evidence
of purely stimulus-drivenattentional capture: early in time,
attention was reflexively shifted to the location of the
uniquely colored singleton. The reappearance of the fixa-
tion cross 350 msec after the presentation of the uniquely
colored singleton allowed attention to move back to the cen-
ter fixation location. The subsequent movement of atten-
tion back to the previously attended location of the uniquely
colored singleton was inhibited, resulting in longer RTs
when a target was presented at that location than when it
was presented at any other location in the visual field.
It is generally agreed that IOR is the product of the re-
flexive, involuntary orienting systems and cannot be mod-
ulated by any top-down control settings (e.g., Posner &
Cohen, 1984; Pratt et al., 1997; Pratt, Sekuler, & McAul-
iffe, 2001). Recently, however, there has been some debate
as to whether the occurrence of IOR depends on atten-
tional control setting. Gibson and Amelio (2000) used Folk
et al.’s (1992) spatial-cuing task and showed that IOR was
observed when onset cues preceded onset targets, but not
when they preceded color targets. This led Gibson and
Amelio to conclude that attentional control settings do
play a role in the generation of IOR. However, Gibson and
Amelio’s conclusion may be flawed, because they used an
explicit attentional set (e.g., an attentional set for onset or
an attentional set for color). The attentional set may have
caused this unusual pattern of results. Indeed, Pratt,
Sekuler, and McAuliffe included a random condition in
which there was no explicit attentional set (any cue–target
combination was equally likely) and showed that atten-
tional control settings had no effect whatsoever on the
magnitude and the occurrence of IOR.
The evidence that attentional control settings do not have
any consequences for IOR is important because it suggests
that the present findings can only be interpreted as evi-
dence for exogenous, purely stimulus-driven attentional
capture (e.g., Posner & Cohen, 1984; Pratt et al., 1997;
Pratt, Sekuler, & McAuliffe, 2001). Others (e.g., Bacon &
Egeth, 1994; Folk & Remington, 1998) have argued that
Theeuwes’s (1991, 1992, 1996) earlier findings showing
exogenous attentional capture by feature singletons could
be interpreted as the result of attentional control settings.
Even though participants were required to search for a
particular feature in Theeuwes’s earlier experiments, it was
argued by Bacon and Egeth (1994) that the participants in
Theeuwes’s experiments may have adopted a singleton de-
tection mode in which they searched for the odd one out.
Because the participants adopted such a singleton detec-
tion control setting, irrelevant singletons may have cap-
tured attention. In this view, attentional capture is not due
to automatic involuntary capture but, rather, is the result
of top-down attentional control settings. 
In line with this notion, one may claim that the detection
of the offset (i.e., the target event) may have induced a sin-
gleton detection control setting, which then may have re-
sulted in top-down modulated attentional capture. Even
though such an interpretation may explain the facilitation
at the early SOAs in Experiment 2, it cannot explain the
occurrence of IOR at the longer time intervals in Experi-
ments 1 and 3, because there is evidence that a top-down
attentional control setting to look for a singleton cannot
result in IOR (Pratt et al., 2001). As was noted, Pratt,
Sekuler, and McAuliffe (2001) provided evidence that
IOR is associated with involuntary, bottom-up, stimulus-
driven attentional processes.
The present findings are also inconsistent with the fil-
tering hypothesis of Folk and Remington (1998). Accord-
ing to their view, the presence of an irrelevant singleton
may slow responding; yet such slowing may not be ac-
companied by a shift of spatial attention to the location of
the irrelevant singleton. If in the present experiments, the
presence of the irrelevant singleton would not have re-
sulted in a shift of attention to the location of the irrelevant
singleton, there would have been no reason for IOR to
occur at that location. It seems that filtering costs cannot
explain the occurrence of IOR in the present experiment.
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Even though there have been many studies showing
IOR with abrupt onset cues, the present study shows that
IOR can also occur with static singletons. Even though
one may argue that the change of color at the singleton lo-
cation in Experiment 1 could have produced IOR, this ex-
planation does not hold for Experiment 3. In Experiment 3,
the singleton was the only element that did not change.
The finding that a static singleton can produce IOR is in
line with the notion that IOR serves to discourage atten-
tion from reorienting to a location that was already at-
tended (Klein, 2000; Posner & Cohen, 1984). 
One may raise the question of why exogenous atten-
tional capture has been reported in studies using Theeuwes’s
(1992) additional singleton search paradigm, and not in
studies using Folk et al.’s (1992) spatial-cuing task. In a re-
cent study by Theeuwes, Atchley, and Kramer (2000), it
was shown that the attentional capture effect of an irrele-
vant singleton occurs within 100–150 msec of the pre-
sentation of the stimulus display (see also Kim & Cave,
1999, for a similar result). Around 150 msec after the pre-
sentation of the irrelevant singleton, top-down control al-
lows the redirection of attention away from the irrelevant
singleton, thereby reducing or eliminating the distracting
effect of the irrelevant singleton. Since in the spatial-cuing
paradigm of Folk et al. there was always a time lag be-
tween the presentation of the to-be-ignored cue and that of
the target, it is possible that no interference occurred in
these studies because there was enough time to redirect at-
tention away from the to-be-ignored cue. The present
study shows that this short-lived exogenous capture of at-
tention that occurs within 100 to 150 msec after the presen-
tation of the display is enough to generate IOR 1,300 msec
later. 
The notion that the occurrence of IOR is linked to 
stimulus-driven attentional capture is in line with evidence
that points to an intrinsic link between oculomotor activ-
ity and IOR. According to Taylor and Klein (1998), any
condition that activates an oculomotor program generates
IOR (also see Rafal, Calabresi, Brennan, & Sciolto, 1989).
Consistent with this notion is evidence that places the in-
hibition at the level of the superior colliculus (Posner,
Rafal, Choate, & Vaughan, 1985), a structure known to be
involved in producing reflexive saccades (e.g., Mohler &
Wurtz, 1976). If one interprets the present findings along
these lines, it would imply that the salient singleton gen-
erates an exogenous saccade, which becomes inhibited or
suppressed. Even though it may appear that the oculomo-
tor programming notion (e.g., Taylor & Klein, 1998) is
quite different from the exogenous attentional capture ac-
count (e.g., Posner & Cohen, 1984), it should be noted
that, theoretically, it may be impossible to distinguish be-
tween attentional and oculomotor effects. For example,
according to the premotor theory, there is no distinction
between attention and the oculomotor system: Attention is
the result of programming an eye movement to a particu-
lar location (e.g., Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umiltà,
1987). If one assumes that IOR is generated by oculomo-
tor programming and the allocation of attention to a loca-
tion is necessary for oculomotor programming (for which
there is strong evidence; see, e.g., Deubel & Schneider,
1996; Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995; Kowler, Ander-
son, Dosher, & Blaser, 1995), one could maintain the
viewpoint that it is the exogenous attentional capture to a
location that produces IOR. 
Overall, in line with earlier claims, the present findings
provide strong evidence that salient singletons capture
spatial attention in a purely bottom-up, exogenous way.
Even though the employment of an attentional set or fil-
tering costs may have played a role in explaining previous
findings showing attentional capture of singletons, the oc-
currence of an IOR effect rules out the possibility that at-
tentional capture is the result of top-down settings and/or
nonspatial filtering costs. 
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